A case study of the Japanese bank recapitalization by Hoshi and Kashyap (2005) identified a bank that overstated the progress of required personnel downsizing by shifting employees to subsidiaries. This paper asks if the recapitalization program had a systematic flaw in design. We focus on regional banks with a unique panel dataset of 82 banking groups that allows us to observe the employment levels of subsidiaries, in addition to those of parent banks, over fiscal 1994--2006. We estimate a labor-demand equation with sluggish adjustment to compare the employment patterns of public capital recipients and other banks. We found 4 banks increased subsidiary employment after receiving capital injection, but only temporarily. This temporary effect suggests that the personnel shifting was essentially layoffs. Our finding indicates that, despite the limited transparency of personnel sizes on the consolidated basis, rules on capital injection provided incentives for most recipients to pursue downsizing.
Introduction
Responding to a severe accumulation of bad loans, Japanese authorities introduced programs for restructuring commercial banks in the late 1990s. Under the restructuring package, commercial banks received capital injections from the government on condition that they meet restructuring goals on the downsizing of personnel, in addition to capital-ratio and profit targets. Table 1 presents the planned reduction of employees, personnel expenses and nonpersonnel expenses for major banks in the country discussed by Nakaso (1999) .
Those banks on average were required to shed 13.9% of the workforce, or 19,831 workers, from 1999 through 2003. The size of planned reduction in personnel expenses exceeds the planned reduction in nonpersonnel expenses. Clearly, the downsizing of personnel was essential in adjusting the cost structure of these troubled banks.
The UFJ Bank is one of the prominent banks that received fund injections. In a previous study, Hoshi and Kashyap (2005) examined the restructuring of the UFJ Bank over FY2002--04 and found that while the bank boasted a radical personnel cut of 13%, there was virtually no change in the number of workers on consolidated bases (i.e., workers in the UFJ Bank plus those working for the UFJ subsidiaries). Since downsizing was a key component of the restructuring package, the authors suggest that the bank overstated the progress of restructuring by shuffling employees among nonbank subsidiaries, It is however still difficult to assess the changes in the number of employees on a consolidated bases for several cases. This paper asks whether the reconstruction program had a design flow that left leeway for banks to overstate their achievements. To our knowledge, no study has followed up on the case study in Hoshi and Kashyap (2005) to see if the case of the UFJ Bank is an isolated incident. While the case study is compelling, a systematic examination is needed to establish if there was an issue. Further, one might question if banks transferred employees to reduce costs. For instance, fieldwork conducted in 1999 reports that, in downsizing employees, large Japanese manufacturers transferred workers to subsidiaries on a fixed-term basis (a large fraction of which become permanent transfers), avoiding layoffs (Kato 2001) . Thus, while the UFJ Bank was not able to recover by itself eventually, the personnel shuffling could well have been a genuine effort to restructure the company. To overcome the limitations with a case study of an individual bank, we turn to a larger sample, focusing on regional banks. Unlike city banks, some regional banks received public funds but oth-ers did not. This offers an interesting research setting to benchmark injected banks against uninjected banks. Our study is unique in utilizing companylevel data on bank subsidiaries to examine bank restructuring. Montgomery and Shimizutani (2009) examined financial aspects of the capital injection but left the personnel targets unexamined; to our knowledge this paper is the first empirical examination of the human resource aspect of the Japanese capital injection of the late 1990s.
Our empirical examination suggests that the UFJ case is not an isolated incident, but calls into question the motives for shifting workers. We estimate labor demand equations using data from fiscal 1998--2006 on 82 regional banks to see if the employment demands by injected banks significantly deviated from those of uninjected banks in a way that signals target-induced shifting. We estimate the equation separately for parent banks, wholly owned subsidiaries and partially owned subsidiaries. On average, the patterns of subsidiary employment are similar between injected and uninjected banks, though some indications of shifting were present. On close examination of individual employment patterns, we have found four cases of possible shifting. Rather surprisingly, these cases are temporary. Three are temporary increases and one is indeterminate since this bank did not recover on its own and was subsequently nationalized. Our analysis cannot rule out an explanation that some of the personnel shifting took place for the purpose of window dressing. We argue however that the personnel shifting was layoffs in essence. That is, the shifting was a legally feasible option for downsizing in an environment with tight laws on dismissal. Overall, despite the limited transparency of personnel sizes on a consolidated basis, rules on capital injection provided incentives for most public-fund recipients to implement restructuring plans in more than just form.
Our case study on the Japanese capital injection relates to a broader concern on banking rescue operations. A rescue operation often entails government becoming a partial owner through holding preferred stocks. As the ownership and control differs, the agency issue is a concern. Consider the recent financial crises. The U.S. regulators, who need to deal with banks affiliated to multibank holding companies (MBHC), face new challenges due to the complexity of the MBHC's organizational structure. A MBHC owns and controls subsidiary banks and has the ability to shift capital among affiliates as needed (Ashcraft 2006 ). Coates and Scharfstein (2009) argue that a MBHC received funding under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to assist undercapitalized bank subsidiaries but did not allocate funding among group corporations in a way intended by the regulators---that is, to recapitalize troubled bank subsidiaries. Thus, the agency issue, compounded by the complexity of the organizational structure, can hinder the effective delivery of rescue operations.
The target-induced personnel-shuffling is a plausible behavioral response to expect in Japan where the legal environment on layoffs is tight and firms are thought to weigh the interests of employees more heavily than their counterparts in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Japanese firms tend to invest in on-the-job training of employees, and workers with firm-specific capital are difficult to replace in the market. Since firms operating under a different labor-market regime would not be compelled to shield employees in the downturns, a more relevant concern in the U.S. context would be executive compensation. For example, the American International Group---the large insurance company currently under the federal assistance---paid large executive bonuses to public outrage. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 incorporated limitations on executive compensation for banks participating in TARP by setting standards on many different aspects of executive pay (among others: bonus, retention award, incentive compensation). However, the standard on executive compensation may be compromised by taking advantage of closelymanaged affiliates, particularly with regard to executive salaries or even the number of executives. Given that rescue plans are financed by taxpayers, it is important to ensure that funds are spent as intended. Hoshi and Kashyap (2008) demonstrate that the Japanese experience can provide insight on the restructuring of financial institutions through discussions on the asset-and equity-purchase programs. Our paper continues the discussion by documenting one aspect of bank responses that has been largely neglected in previous studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 considers the incentive faced by the recipient of capital injection. Section 4 describes the business groups headed by Japanese regional banks. Section 5 considers the empirical approach. Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 discusses the findings. Section 8 concludes. 6 
Related Literature
The Japanese banking crisis of the late 1990s has been studied extensively.
Montgomery and Shimizutani (2009) also consider the effectiveness of the capital injections but focus mainly on the financial aspects of the reconstruction program. The goals of capital injections relate to (1) bank capital ratios, (2) write-offs of nonperforming loans, (3) lending to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and (4) The authors also find that the second round of capital injections had a significant impact on write-offs of nonperforming loans for both international and domestic banks. The second round of capital injection was also found to increase lending to SMEs. Multinational corporations are known to shift income into group corporations located in favorably taxed jurisdictions to reduce tax payments (Gordon and Hines 2002). Likewise, a financial conglomerate transfers assets between separately regulated divisions to avoid high capital charges (e.g., Freixas, Lóránth, and Morrison 2007). The behaviors considered in our paper are similar to these known behaviors in that both take advantage of the presence of affiliated but legally independent corporations. One difference is that our focus is on "real" production inputs, rather than financial transactions.
Finally, our examination of bank employment is relevant in considering the changing role of the main bank system in Japan. The rise of direct finance in the country is argued to have contributed to the declining importance of the main banks in Japan. A recent study by Hoshi, Koibuchi, and Schaede (2009) documents the decline in the likelihood of bank-led restructuring during the extended recession of the 1990s. If rescue operations can be thought of as being human-capital intensive, the decline in employment documented in our paper offers a supply-side explanation for the reduced role of banks.
Capital Injection
The injection of public capital of the late 1990s was implemented against the backdrop of a broader financial sector reform that was intended to make administrative oversight more transparent and fair by moving towards one that is based on the principles of market mechanisms and self-reliance. Montgomery Thus, the group of banks that received capital injection included those that were not insolvent in the regulators' judgment. Second, the FRC reviews a draft of a business-improvement plan submitted by the bank, and conducts a hearing with representatives of the bank. In evaluating plans submitted by regional banks, the FSA took into consideration the their importance in the local economies. After the preliminary examination, the bank then revises the plan and formally applies for funds. In the case of Kumamoto Family Bank, the approval took 35 days from an initial briefing on November 4, 1999.
After being approved, a bank receives funding through preferred stocks or subordinate debts.
In the follow-up, the government acts as an active shareholder with a power to invoke punitive measures. FSA monitors approved banks in quarterly hearings designed to discover measures implemented to achieve the plan. The FSA also requires the disclosure of progress reports, which are published on the its website. In case the realized outcome deviates substantially from a target and the market disapproves of a bank's performance, the government considers punitive measures. The benchmark for underperformance includes the actual return on equity being 30% below the target return on equity (ROE). The assessment of the market evaluation is based on objective measures such as stock price, interest rate on borrowing, and deposit movements. The targets include those on the personnel costs and administrative expenses. In the case of unsatisfactory performance, the government considers invoking a businessimprovement order, under which a bank may be prohibited or restrained from paying dividends and executive bonuses or, in the worse case, closed down. In sum, this mechanism intends to foster self-correction of bank behavior using market forces and the government's power.
How would this oversight mechanism affect the downsizing of injected banks? The regulatory body and bank management develop a target on personnel cuts jointly since a business-improvement plan receives feedback as described. A downsizing plan, if sensibly devised, would require a bank to cut personnel faster than it would otherwise have done on its own. This is likely since the regulatory authority would require cost cuttings given the government's stake in the bank. Also, a worker's union, which is enterprise based, may be less inclined to resist a personnel cut when faced with the risk of being closed down. A downsizing plan is thus likely to be aggressive. Managers have strong incentives to achieve a planned personnel cut at a parent bank since a failure to achieve the goal may lead to a loss of their positions.
Why, then, would a bank's management not lay off workers, instead shifting them to subsidiaries? First, the case law on dismissals limits the management's option for outright layoffs. Adjustment must first come from a hiring freeze and early retirements. Transferring workers to subsidiaries can be the only legally feasible option available. Second, a firm and workers may have an implicit agreement regarding the continuity of their relationship. Lifetime employment and seniority wages for male workers was a common practice in the Japanese banking industry. Under those practices, young workers are paid below their productivity in expectation of a higher wage later in their working lives at the company. The implicit agreement fostered between a bank and employees may in addition have affected the acceptable conduct of bank management. Additionally, workers with firm-specific capital would be hard to replace in the market, so shifting may be done for hoarding purposes. The personnel shifting thus appears to be a plausible behavioral response in the Japanese context.
Since the concept of employees can be complex, its measurement may not be as transparent to the regulator as other performance measures; the level of employees on a consolidated basis is not necessarily reported in the business-improvement reports. It thus seems highly plausible to expect bank managers to transfer employees in case the necessary reductions cannot be achieved through, for example, an early retirement package. Other targets, however, mitigate this incentive to some degree. For one, the stock market performance of a bank would likely be based on consolidated performance.
While permanent transfers to subsidiaries reduce the personnel costs as the workers' salaries are reduced, investors may disapprove of a resulting cost structure. Moreover, if an administrative-costs target is binding, it will not help the bank to relabel personnel expenses as outsourcing fees. Perhaps most important, a bank may be punished for not meeting a target on ROE. Thus, a bank has a strong incentive to meet personnel targets at the parent level, but the extent of shifting is likely to depend on corporate culture and whether a bank can meet other targets. While current financial statements contain reports on subsidiaries, information from the 1990s are often missing; ACD thus is a valuable information source on banking groups. ACD, however, starts presenting consolidated employment, rather than stand-alone figures, during the sample period. We obtained stand-alone employment figures for parent banks from Nikkei's NEEDS and detailed accounting information and performance benchmarks from Flitch IBCA's BankScope. 3 Toyo Keizai complies ACD based on surveys and financial statements. ACD contains company-level information on basic financial information (sales, profit, paid-in capital), company characteristics (e.g., number of workers, 2-digit industry, short description of business operation, location, name of company representative), and information on group affiliation.
The group structure
Subsidiaries of regional banks mainly conduct two lines of business operations: finance and logistics. Financial subsidiaries offer credit cards, leasing, venture capital, factoring, credit guarantees on consumer loans, and investment consulting. Though banks had been allowed to operate securities subsidiaries since 1993 and city banks started owning security subsidiaries thereafter, regional banks except the "top three" (Chiba, Shizuoka, and Yokohama) had not entered into the security business at least before FY2000.
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Banks were restricted from holding more than a 5% stake in financial subsidiaries until the mid-1990s, but the semiformal tie between a parent and its subsidiaries is apparent from the sharing of corporate identity and from often locating at an identical address. Larger regional banks tend to own more diverse sets of subsidiaries than their smaller counterparts. The most common operations are credit card processors and, in the later period, leasing companies, both of which are nonbank credit operations.
Nonfinancial subsidiaries undertake logistical operations outsourced by parent banks. Typical outsourced activities include day-to-day operations such as IT maintenance, cash handling, payment collection, building maintenance, and miscellaneous logistics. Most banks have a wholly owned temporary staffing company, supplying logistical support staff to parent branches. Some banks currently hire even tellers through staffing companies. A court case on a labor dispute involving the Iyo bank and its staffing company suggests that while 4 The Bank of Ryukyu did report owning a security company as a group company before JFY1994.
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hired by a legally separated company, those temporary/contract workers are fully controlled by the parent banks---which is not surprising since those companies are often physically located within parent banks. Some subsidiaries are specialized in asset evaluation, sales of foreclosed assets, or development of IT systems. These subsidiaries are typically wholly owned. Once again, large banks tend to outsource more than smaller banks. 
Descriptive statistics
"Employee" has multiple meanings in practice and warrants an explanation.
In our analysis, the number of employees corresponds to figures reported in financial statements, and excludes the members of the board and part-time employees for both parent and subsidiary data. The information on part timers is not available in our data. The subsidiary figure reported in ACD excludes those workers on temporarily transfer (shukkou) from parent banks (i.e., zero employment is reported for a subsidiary in which its entire workforce consists of shukkou workers). Permanent transfers (tenseki )---transfers that terminate the workers' employment contracts with a parent and initiate a formal relationship with a subsidiary---are counted as subsidiary employment. The parent figure obtained from NEEDS is from the financial statement. Some inconsistency may exist, but this figure typically excludes shukkou workers from the definition of employees. If banks increased the number of shukkou workers dur-5 A window-dressing operation known as tobashi involves paper companies that are controlled by a parent bank. A tobashi operation aims to reduce bad loans on balance sheets: The paper company overpays for a debtor's collateral asset so that the debtor can pay back its loan. We have checked for the presence of paper companies in the criminal investigation of now-dissolved Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, but naturally, those shell companies were not included in ACD.
ing their restructuring process, the financial statement figures overstate the extent of employment cuts at the parent level. However, as capital-injected banks report to FSA the employment figures that include shukkou workers in their reconstruction report, the capital injection limits perverse incentives to inflate the extent of employment cuts in this way.
Our sample base is the first-and second-tier regional banks listed in stock exchanges. To maintain comparability of groups across time while ensuring sufficient sample size, we adopted the following protocol in dealing with banks that changed structures through mergers and acquisitions. We compiled the information on mergers and acquisitions through BankScope's bank-history section ( Table 2 ). The list indicates the stability of the regional banking during the 1990s and an active reorganization in the 2000s. We dropped six banks that restructured by the end of JFY2000 in the analysis. For those banks reorganized after FY2000, we dropped observations on those banks from the year following the restructuring.
The number of workers reported in the ACD is nearly complete in the banking sector; the raw ACD data contain nonmissing information on workers for about 97% of bank subsidiaries. Nonetheless, because nonreporting of the number of workers in one year renders a cross-time comparison within a firm difficult, we treat as missing those subsidiary-year observation in which more than 10% of the group subsidiaries contains missing information on the number of workers. These selection criteria left 82 regional banks as a base sample. Table 3 lists the regional banks included in the sample, the average number of employees in the parent and subsidiaries, the average number of subsidiaries and the average assets for each bank over JFY1988--2000. The average sizes of parents and aggregated subsidiaries are, respectively, 2,149 and 268 workers. Roughly half the subsidiary employment is at 100% owned companies, but the variation is large: the range for time averages is 12 to 97%.
The average number of subsidiaries is 8.2, of which 34% is wholly owned.
Empirical Analysis

Basic Strategy
We focus on regional banks to examine the impact of the capital injection of the late 1990s in Japan. Regional banks are important players in the local economy, accounting for 34.3% of total private lending in 2008. The total deposits at regional bank in 2009 was 2.7 times as much as the total deposits for all banks in Australia. The key advantage in focusing on the regional banks, rather than the national banks, is the richness of the comparison group. Most of the major national banks were recipients of public funds in the late 1990s---it is thought that the fear of being singled out as a "troubled bank" led national banks to coordinate the take-up decision. On the other hand, 9.3% of banks that belong to the Regional Bank Association of Japan (RBAJ), which consists of 64 large regional banks around Japan, received the financial assistance in the late 1990s. Similarly, 11.1% of banks that belong to the Second Association of Regional Banks (SARB), which consists of 45 small regional banks, had received assistance. The variation in funds injection provides an interesting research setting. Of course, the assignment of injection is not random, but the mix of the sample is instrumental in examining whether the employment patterns differ between injected and uninjected banks.
Empirical model
Our objective is to determine whether injected banks, other than the UFJ, shifted personnel due to capital injection. We compare the time series of employment for capital-injected banks with that of other banks to see if they are different around the time of capital injections. A positive effect of the injection on the employment at subsidiaries of injected banks in conjunction with a negative effect on parent bank employment is to be taken as evidence consistent with the personnel shifting being widespread. We modify a labor-demand equation with sluggish adjustment considered by Arellano and Bond (1991) as follows.
where y i t k is log employment for the k th organization type (parent, wholly owned subsidiary, partially owned subsidiary) in banking group i at time t.
The lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side is designed to capture the dynamic dependence. inject i t−j is a dummy for banks that received capital injection in t − j. For banks that received multiple injections, we used the first injection to define this variable. In practice most injection occurs close to the end of the financial year and the following financial year is taken as the first postintervention year ( Table 4 ). The injected group consists of 12 banks, but we use 11 in practice since much of Fukuoka City Bank's information is missing. ω t k is designed to capture type--year-specific time effects.
The effects of capital injection on employment can last over time since The model is separately estimated for employment level at parent, wholly owned subsidiary, and partially owned subsidiary, where y i t 1 , y i t 2 , and y i t 3 denote the number of employees at the parent banks, all subsidiaries, and 6 We would expect wholly owned subsidiaries and partially owned subsidiaries to respond differently, but whether more shifting will take place in either type remains an empirical question. A bank has incentives to shift personnel to subsidiaries whose account is unconsolidated since such operations may improve performance reported in consolidated statements. It may however be costless to shift employees to fully controlled entities. If anything, the results suggest that the latter force is dominant.
wholly owned subsidiaries, respectively. X i t is a vector of determinants of labor demand. In a preliminary analysis with a shorter time span (FY1994--2000) , we considered real wage and real output growth for the region where a bank has its headquarters. The regional GDP and GDP deflator in the initial analysis is only available over 1990--2003. To examine a longer postintervention sample, we decided to drop those controls and instead report a specification with nominal wage. This allows us to examine the employment pattern for a longer time frame. The estimates on key coefficients were not sensitive to inclusion of real wage and real GDP growth in the earlier analysis. 
Estimation methods
We consider three estimation methods to better assess sensitivity. As a preliminary regression, we present a fixed effect regression. As is well known, the lagged dependent variable in the left-hand side raises a concern about the dynamic panel bias given the small time-series dimension and the moderately sized cross section. We present Arellano and Bond's (1991) estimator, a commonly applied solution to this issue. We also estimate an augmented version of Arellano and Bond's (1991) estimator developed in Blundell and Bond 7 The data source for the nominal wage is an average salary of financial-sector male employees for a given region in the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (Chingin Kōzō Kihon Tōkei Chosa) published by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. The data source for the regional GDP growth rates is the regional account (Kenmin Keizai Keisan) published by the Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office. The series used for the robustness check discussed later is 93SNA (2000 base) which connects over 1996--2007. Unlike the national GDP, regional GDP series do not connect to the earlier data. This can make the two-step robust more efficient than one-step robust, es-pecially for the system GMM. Our augmented version of the Arellano--Bond estimates are based on the two-step GMM estimator with finite-sample correction. The exogenous variables in our estimation of the augmented Arellano--Bond model are the year dummy, the injection dummies (inject i t−j ) and the log of nominal wage. For robustness, we also considered a specification that weakens a restriction by treating the injection dummies and nominal wage as predetermined rather than exogenous. This alternative specification does not qualitatively change the result and is not reported. The dependent variable for Columns 9--12 is the log of employment size at wholly owned subsidiaries. As above, the year effects are negative and significant for all specifications for nearly all years. Unlike the previous company types, the coefficients on inject i t−j are consistently positive except for one year in Column 11. The magnitude of the coefficients is interesting. The range for the contemporaneous effect is 5--14%. The range for the first lag is 22--32%. The range for the second lag is −6--11%. The larger magnitude for the first lag suggests a temporary deviation from the uninjected sample. As the shifting seems to be a temporary phenomenon, the pattern does not seem to fit so well with the interpretation that banks shifted employees purely to meet regulatory targets. The results show that the two groups are similar on average, but it would be hasty to conclude that there was no shifting: The sample size of injected bank may be too small to pick up the effect. We will return to this point below. 
Results
Baseline model
Alternative specification
We estimated an alternative labor-demand equation where we impose less structure on the data:
The model is similar to (1) Table 6 presents the results. The dependent variable for Columns 1--4 is the log of employment size at parent banks. The main coefficients of interest---those on JFY2000 as well as the interaction term between treat i and JFY2000---are consistently negative and significant at the 5% level across specifications.
Once again, the estimates show that the injected banks downsized more rapidly than the benchmark banks. The dependent variables for Columns 9--12 are the log of employment size at wholly owned subsidiaries. Notably, the coefficient on the interaction treat i and JFY2001 is consistently positive and significant for all but the difference GMM specification. The deviation from the benchmark sample is not significant for other years. This is in a sharp contrast with the benchmark sample where coefficients are mostly negative and often significant. As before, these estimates are indicative of a temporary deviation of the injected banks from the uninjected banks. Furthermore, the deviation seems to occur in 2001.
Discussion
The regression analysis suggested an increase in 2001 of the employment at wholly owned subsidiaries owned by injected banks. As the employment at parent banks was declining faster for injected banks, the pattern appears to be consistent with the personnel-shifting hypothesis. Anecdotally, Ashikaga
Bank implemented an aggressive restructuring plan, reducing employment by 26.3% over JFY2000--2003. Over JFY1998--2000, Ashikaga Bank reduced employment by 6.7% but increased subsidiary employment by 9.3%. In net, employment at the group level fell by 4.9%. Thus, the shifting appears to have taken place not just in the UFJ but also in other regional banks.
Unexpectedly, however, the shifting seems temporary. To obtain a better sense behind the average, Figure 1 Alternatively, the original intent could have been just to bypass the tight dismissal law. The banks transferred employees to some undesirable position so that workers are induced to move on. Loans officers for instance may find it demoralizing to monitor and maintain automatic teller machines. If the transfers were just disguised dismissals, the shifting would not have been purely window dressing. Lastly, banks might have transferred workers who were about to retire in a year or two. Without additional demographic information on workers being shifted, a firm conclusion about the intent of banks cannot be drawn. While we acknowledge that at least some part of the shifting might have been driven by the need for compliance, in the absence of evidence of longer-term transfer, it seems sensible to hypothesize that the shifting were largely disguised layoffs.
Conclusion
This paper investigated the employment pattern of Japanese regional banks that received capital injections in the late 1990s to see if employees were shifted into subsidiaries in order to appear to be meeting restructuring targets.
Our approach was to estimate a labor-demand equation to see if the employment demands by injected banks significantly deviated from uninjected banks in a way that signaled possible shifting. We found evidence consistent with shifting, corroborating the previous case study of the UFJ Bank (Hoshi and Kashyap 2005). However, that shifting was temporary and raised question about whether the shifting was done as window dressing. We interpreted the temporary shifting as disguised layoffs: Labor law limited banks' option of firing workers; therefore, downsizing beyond that attained through early retirement and a hiring freeze was achieved by sending redundant workers to marginal positions so that they were induced to resign.
We noted that the recapitalization program lacks a systematic requirement on disclosure of group employment. As a result, in business reconstruction reports, some banks disclose the number of employees at subsidiaries while others report stand-alone figures only. This uneven requirement can be a source of possible manipulation. Nonetheless, our finding is consistent with a view that the overall monitoring mechanism ensured compliance with downsizing targets. We think that the performance requirement on, for example, the return on equity and the threat of penalty placed sufficient incentives for bank managers to implement aggressive layoffs, rather than to attempt to securing workers' employment.
We omitted international banks from our analysis due to a substantial complexity with larger banks' group structure. The behavior of city banks and trust banks is an interesting topic for a further study. Information on age and gender of subsidiary workers would shed light on the intent of shifting as the gender-based division of labor in banking operations appears to persist to date. Robust standard errors in parentheses; FE = fixed effects estimator; AB = Arellano-Bond estimator; AB2 = augmented Arellano-Bond estimator; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Robust standard errors in parentheses; FE = fixed effects estimator; AB = Arellano-Bond estimator; AB2 = augmented Arellano-Bond estimator; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
